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USING A FLOW-CHART TO REDUCE JUROR’S PRE-EXISTING BIASES IN  
CASES UTILIZING THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
by 
LAUREN M. SCHLUMPER 
(Under the Direction of Amy Hackney) 
ABSTRACT 
Many people believe that the insanity defense is used to avoid responsibility for committing a 
crime and that it returns dangerous individuals back to the streets. Due to the fact that it is 
difficult to separate such pre-existing attitudes from evidence presented throughout the trial, 
many jurors use their attitudes to assist them when deciding a verdict and punishment. For 
example, Steblay, Hosch, Culhane & McWethy (2006) found that not only is it difficult for 
jurors to disregard information that is not relevant or presented during trial, but that pre-trial 
information and attitudes can actually influence their verdict. The present study examines how 
dispositional instructions affect juror decision making in an insanity case. Participants completed 
a scale that assessed their attitudes toward the insanity defense and read a case description, 
determined a verdict, and recommended a sentence. Participant’s attitudes toward the insanity 
defense influenced their verdict suggestions and recommended sentences.  The type of 
dispositional information given to participants affected the amount of knowledge about 
defendants using the insanity defense, but did not affect verdicts or sentences.  The implications 
of dispositional information presented to participants are discussed as well as the influence of 
pre-existing attitudes towards the insanity defense on verdict determination. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 8, 2011 Jared Loughner allegedly shot and killed six people, including a U.S. 
District Court judge, while injuring 14 others in Tucson, Arizona. It is likely he will enter a plea 
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Such a plea may cause some people to feel that justice will 
not be served. Many people believe that the insanity defense is used to avoid responsibility for 
committing a crime. Because of this belief, the insanity defense has been altered, banned, and 
reintroduced multiple times throughout United States’ history. The numerous changes to the 
insanity defense description have influenced the beliefs of lawmakers as well as the general 
public. Some common, but incorrect, beliefs about the insanity defense include that it is used to 
avoid responsibility, it is exercised far too frequently, and that the majority of defendants who 
use the defense are found not guilty by reason of insanity.  
 Negative media attention focused on the insanity defense, such as the media coverage of 
the John Hinkley trial (and likely in the near future, the Jared Loughner trial), make it difficult 
for potential jurors to put aside their beliefs about the insanity defense; such publicity increases 
the perception that the insanity defense is unjust (Bloechl, Vitacco, Neuman, & Erickson, 2007). 
Due to the fact that it is difficult to separate pre-existing attitudes from evidence presented at 
trial, many jurors use their attitudes to assist them when deciding a verdict and punishment. For 
example, Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWethy (2006) found that not only is it difficult for 
jurors to disregard information that is not relevant or information not presented during trial, but 
that such information can actually influence their verdict. Research still needs to be conducted 
regarding the extent these pre-existing attitudes actually affect verdict and sentence 
determinations when the defendant on trial is utilizing the insanity defense. The current study 
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aims to reduce the impact of inaccurate beliefs about the insanity defense by providing mock 
jurors procedural information about not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) cases.   
History of the Insanity Defense 
 The insanity defense has long been a part of legal history, though it has been known by 
different names. In England during the thirteenth century a test existed known as the “wild beast 
test;” this test was used to assess a defendant’s ability to know better than an “infant, brute or 
wild beast” (p. 292) what the laws were and that they had to be followed (Allnutt, Samuels, & 
O'Driscoll, 2007). Criminal responsibility, or the ability to know laws should be followed, has 
two parts: actus reus and mens rea. Actus reus is the actual physical act associated with criminal 
responsibility, while mens rea involves the intent in addition to the physical act of the crime 
(Carson & Felthous, 2003). By the sixteenth century, lack of mens rea due to mental defect was 
grounds for dismissing criminal responsibility (Carson & Felthous, 2003).  
In 1843 Daniel M’Naughten killed the secretary of the British Prime Minister, mistakenly 
believing that the man murdered was the Prime Minister. Until the 1800s when the M’Naughten 
trial was held, insanity as defined by law was a very loose term that was difficult to actually 
apply to legal cases (Allnutt et al., 2007).  M’Naughten reported a belief that the Prime Minister 
was part of a conspiracy to kill him. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity and, because 
of this case, criteria were established to determine the possible mental illness of a defendant and 
how to apply those findings to legal responsibility (Allnutt et al., 2007). The rules put in place 
due to this case included that 1) people are assumed sane unless proven otherwise; and 2) that in 
order to prove insanity, facts must be presented to show that at the time of the crime, the accused 
person had a disease of the mind preventing them from reasoning. Defendants also had to show 
that they could not tell right from wrong at the time of the crime (Allnutt et al., 2007).  
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 The M’Naughten rule was used frequently in the United States beginning in the 1850s, 
but due to the lack of support from the general public, the United States starting using a test of 
“irresistible impulse” in addition to the M’Naughten rule. This test was designed to help 
determine insanity by assessing the degree to which a defendant could control their impulse to 
kill or commit other crimes. Because this test of insanity also received much opposition due to its 
broad definition of insanity, the United States added the “product” test, or Durham rule, which 
stated that the suspect’s responsibility for a crime could be removed if it was due to, a “product” 
of, mental disease. This is rarely used today because it relies on the definition of mental disease, 
which was never clearly established (Allnutt et al., 2007).  
 The three rules and tests mentioned above all raised concerns. As a result, a compromise 
known as the American Law Institute (ALI) rule was created (Towers, 1997). This rule states 
that a person cannot be held responsible for a crime if during the time of the crime, the defendant 
could not understand the wrongfulness of the act because of a mental disorder, and therefore 
could not follow the law. Today, most states use some version of the ALI rule when determining 
sanity of defendants (Towers, 1997).  
Defendants Using the Insanity Defense 
Boehnert (1989) found defendants who successfully entered a plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity (meaning they were found not guilty by reason of insanity) were more likely to be 
white males with an average 10
th
-grade education, being defended by a public defender, older 
than the typical inmate population, and had a prior arrest record. It was also found that 
defendants who used a private attorney were accused of trying to buy their way out of taking 
responsibility for the crime. These beliefs show that negative opinions about the insanity defense 
are often present when hearing cases in which the defense is used (Boehnert, 1989). 
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Studies show that the gender of the defendant is a significant factor in the outcome of an 
insanity defense trial (Breheney, Groscup, & Galietta, 2007; Yourstone, Lindholm, Grann, & 
Svenson, 2008). However, there are conflicting research findings regarding the impact of gender. 
Yourstone et al. (2008) found that if the participants were clinicians and psychology students, 
they were more likely to find a female defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. Participants 
reading a case vignette and deciding whether the defendant was legally insane or not determined 
female defendants to be legally insane in 35% of cases, where men were found legally insane in 
only 18% of cases (Yourstone et al., 2008).  
Breheney et al. (2007) however, found that participants thought female defendants were 
more aware, and therefore more responsible for their actions. When participants were asked to 
act as jurors and read six case vignettes, determine a verdict (guilty, not guilty, not guilty by 
reason of insanity), and then answer questions about trial facts and evidence, they found that 
female defendants were found guilty more often, which follows the belief that women are more 
aware and in control of what they are doing during a crime (Breheney et al., 2007). Gender of the 
juror may also affect outcomes, with female jurors more likely to say the defendant was acting 
on an impulse, and therefore the mental illness was responsible for the crime (Breheney et al., 
2007). The researchers also found that women are more likely to attribute less responsibility to 
the defendant, especially if the jurors are made aware that the defendant has a history of 
psychological disorders; more likely to be accepting of psychiatry in the court room; and more 
likely to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity when the option is present (Breheney et 
al., 2007).  
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Insanity Defense Attitudes 
The insanity defense often evokes strong attitudes. The public asks questions such as “are 
people using the defense as an ‘out?’” and “is the defense overused?” Judges usually assume that 
jurors can be unbiased when deciding the verdict of a trial and that jurors will only use the 
information presented during the trial when making their decision. However, jurors often use 
pre-existing beliefs to decide verdicts instead of the facts and evidence presented during the trial. 
For example, Skeem and Golding (2001) found that jurors’ preexisting prototypes of insanity 
interfered with the jurors’ ability to act impartially and had a greater effect on verdict 
determination than the facts presented during the trial.   
Skeem, Louden & Evans (2004) built upon jurors’ prototypes to develop a scale to 
measure the actual beliefs of potential jurors. The scale, known later as the Insanity Defense 
Attitudes Scale (IDA), consists of two subscales. 
The first subscale, “strict liability,” measures the participant’s belief that an individual’s 
mental illness is linked with the inability to make rational decisions and gain control of the 
situation. This subscale measures the belief that defendants should be held accountable 
regardless of mental illness. The second subscale, “injustice and danger,” assesses the 
participant’s belief that the insanity defense is misused to the extent that those found not guilty 
by reason of insanity will be let out and continue to be a danger to society (Skeem et al., 2004).  
One inaccurate belief potential jurors have is that the insanity defense is used too 
frequently (Skeem et al., 2004). Janofsky, Dunn, Roskes, Briskini and Rudolph (1996) examined 
the extent to which pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity were actually entered and taken to  
trial. The researchers found that 190 defendants in Baltimore City entered a plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Of those defendants, all but 8 dropped the plea before they went to trial, and 
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in all 8 of those cases, the prosecution and defense decided the defendant should indeed not be 
held criminally responsible. Therefore, all 8 remaining cases resulted in charges being dropped 
or the defendant being found not competent to stand trial (Janofsky et al., 1996). 
 Another inaccurate belief about the insanity defense is the overestimation of the number 
of defendants who are actually acquitted because of their use of the defense (Skeem et al., 2004). 
A majority of the population is under the impression that a defendant found not guilty by reason 
of insanity is simply let back into society. In actuality, fewer than 1% of cases involve the 
insanity defense, and of those, only 26% actually result in a NGRI verdict, in which the 
defendant is treated in a mental facility until a judge finds the defendant healthy enough to return 
to society (Silver, Cirincione, & Steadman, 1994). 
 Even if information is presented to jurors showing the low number of defendants who 
are found not guilty by reason of insanity and that research shows the belief that the defense is 
overused still stands (Skeem et al., 2004). These numbers show that the majority opinion of 
overuse of the insanity defense is unfounded (Borum, Fulero, & Soloman, 1999; Janofsky et al., 
1996; McGinley & Blau, 1982). Clearly, data show that only a small number of defendants enter 
a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and even fewer make it to a trial by jury (McGinley & 
Blau, 1982). This inaccurate belief about the insanity defense can have negative effects on any 
defendant wishing to implement the insanity defense.  
As previously mentioned, not only does the general public have inaccurate beliefs about 
the use of the defense, but people also have inaccurate beliefs about what happens to defendants 
found NGRI.  For example, in one study, only 25% of participants accurately believed that 
defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity are confined, either in a jail or prison or in 
some form of mental health care facility, until they are determined ready and safe to be back in 
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the public by a doctor (Silver, Cirincione, & Steadman, 1994). The other 75% of participants 
erroneously believed that those found not guilty by reason of insanity are simply let free and 
allowed to go back into society. In actuality, research has found that a defendant found not guilty 
by reason of insanity and then sent to a mental health care facility is likely to stay confined twice 
as long as someone sent to prison for the same crime (Rodriguez, LeWinn, & Perlin, 1983).  
The negative beliefs and attitudes toward the insanity defense may be due to the publicity 
of high profile cases in which the defense is used (Janofsky et al., 1996). People may become 
emotionally involved in such cases and believe that these “famous” criminals who get away with 
horrific crimes represent the norm in insanity defense cases. The M’Naughten case was highly 
publicized and many people opposed the use of the insanity defense after his case. More 
recently, John Hinkley, the attempted assassin of former U.S. president Ronald Reagan, was 
found not guilty by reason of insanity.  
Further, Jeffrey Dahmer, who was convicted of killing, torturing and being involved in 
cannibalistic acts with 17 boys, entered the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, but was 
ultimately found guilty (Janofsky et al., 1996). Some researchers have found empirical support  
for a belief in society that the insanity defense is so grossly overused due to the abnormal media 
attention these cases receive. This may be due to the type of criminal; criminals using the 
insanity defense who commit heinous acts are more likely to receive media attention because of 
the nature of the crime, which leads people to believe the insanity defense is used far more often 
than it really is (Janofsky et al., 1996).  
If a juror has a negative opinion about the insanity defense, then that opinion tends to 
hold more weight in the determination of a verdict than the actual evidence and information 
presented in trial (Hawkins & Pasewark, 1983; Silver et al., 1994; Skeem et al., 2004). Not only 
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that, but these opinions tend to be very difficult to change, even when actual information about 
data on defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity are presented to the jurors (Skeem et 
al., 2004). It is important to understand the impact that jurors’ pre-existing beliefs play in a jury 
situation, and that the jurors are not blank slates that only draw on case-presented facts when 
determining verdicts.  
A study by Schlumper, Miller, and Hackney (2009) investigated the effects of 
perceptions of the insanity defense and verdict outcomes. Participants read case descriptions in 
which the defendant, a mentally ill man, pled not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity to 
homicide. They also answered questions assessing their opinions of the insanity defense via the 
Insanity Defense Attitude Scale- Revised (IDA-R). Participants next had to determine a verdict: 
guilty, not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity; estimate how likely it was that the defendant 
committed the crime (on a 1-7 scale); and determine how confident the participant was in their 
verdict, (also on a scale from one to seven). The participants also had to fill in a sentencing 
recommendation in an open-response format. Results showed a strong association between 
insanity defense attitudes and verdicts and insanity defense attitudes and recommended 
sentencing.  Specifically, the lower participants scored on the strict liability subscale of the IDA-
R, and the injustice and danger subscale of the IDA-R, the more likely they were to determine a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.  Participants who scored low on the injustice and 
danger subscale were also more likely to recommend that the defendant be sentenced to a mental 
health care facility rather than a prison. 
Preventing Biases from Entering the Courtroom 
 It is evident that even when jurors are instructed not to consider extra-evidential factors 
(Finkel, 1989), such as their inaccurate beliefs about the insanity defense, it is unlikely they will 
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heed this warning. Defendants wishing to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity may 
choose a different route, simply because of the likelihood they will not receive the fair trial they 
are entitled to receive.  
 Negative biases affect a juror’s ability to clearly and impartially process information from 
a trial (Silver et al., 1994; Skeem et al., 2004; Wheatman & Shaver, 2001). The question then 
becomes, how does one prevent these pre-existing biases from influencing juror decision 
making? That is, how can jurors’ preexisting negative attitudes be kept out of their verdict 
determination process?  
 Wheatman and Shaffer (2001) provided mock jurors with dispositional instructions, that 
is, actual information about what happens to a defendant if they are found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. In their study, jurors watched a tape of a man on trial for murder who entered a plea of 
not guilty by reason of insanity. Half of the participants received information prior to verdict 
determination about what type of punishment the defendant would receive should he be found 
not guilty by reason of insanity, and the other half received no such information. Participants 
were also split as to whether they received the information before or after deliberation. 
Wheatman and Shaffer (2001) analyzed individual verdicts before deliberation and group 
verdicts after deliberation.  
Results showed that prior to deliberation, the dispositional instructions made little 
difference in jurors’ verdicts.  Thirty-five percent of participants receiving punishment 
instructions believed that the defendant was NGRI compared to 27% of jurors who did not 
receive punishment instructions, a nonsignificant difference.  After deliberation, however, 60% 
of the jurors that received the punishment instruction determined that the defendant was NGRI 
while 7% of jurors that did not receive punishment instructions voted NGRI.  Thus, deliberation 
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led to a leniency shift for those jurors who received the punishment information and a harshness 
shift for those jurors who did not receive the punishment information.  Content analyses of 
deliberations revealed that juries in the information condition were not concerned about the 
consequences of a NGRI verdict while juries not receiving punishment information were very 
concerned that the defendant would be released back to society after a NGRI verdict.   
 It is important to note that instructed jurors only seemed to recognize the true 
consequences of a NGRI verdict after deliberating with other jurors.  This transformation in 
understanding will depend, however, on the nature of the deliberating juries.  It is easy to 
imagine a scenario in which a juror opposed to the insanity defense controls the deliberation 
process.  Thus, it seems imperative that more be done predeliberation to help individual jurors 
understand the consequences of a NGRI verdict. With that in mind, the current study proposes to 
enhance the Georgia Instruction by providing individual jurors with a flowchart detailing the 
procedure of NGRI decisions.   
The Present Study 
In a capital murder case, Wiener et al. (2004) found that presenting procedural 
information to jurors in a flowchart allowed them to see the natural progression of the law. 
Further, when the sentencing procedure was presented in a flowchart jurors were able to read in 
more detail what actually happens to a defendant once they are sentenced, allowing them to 
make a more informed decision than if the sentencing information was simply presented in a 
declarative manner (Wiener et al., 2004). In addition to research by Wiener et al. (2004), other 
research supports the use of using flowcharts to help jurors understand legal processes (Daftary-
Kapur, Dumas, & Penrod, 2010). Because it appears that jurors may have a difficult time 
understanding a judge’s verbal instructions or comprehending an abstract idea, such as what 
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exactly happens to a defendant once they are sentenced, a flowchart may help provide jurors with 
key elements, such as what happens to defendants once they are found not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  This additional information may allow jurors to feel more confident when making 
judicial decisions (Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010). Based on this line of reasoning, we proposed the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1:  
Pre-existing biases about the insanity defense would affect a mock juror’s verdict 
determination and sentence recommendation. Specifically, those with an inaccurate opinion of 
the insanity defense would be more likely to say the defendant is guilty and recommend prison 
time while participants with positive or neutral opinions about the insanity defense would be 
more likely to say the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity and recommend time in a 
mental health facility.  
Hypothesis 2a:  
Providing mock jurors with Georgia dispositional information about the outcome should 
a defendant be found NGRI would affect their verdict and sentence recommendation by 
increasing the number of NGRI verdicts and mental health facility sentences.  
Hypothesis 2b: 
If the Georgia dispositional information about defendants found NGRI is presented in a 
specific flow chart, the number of NGRI verdicts and mental health facility sentences should be 
further increased.  
Hypothesis 3: 
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Participants who receive the Georgia dispositional information about the defendant found 
NGRI in a flowchart, and who have a positive attitude toward the insanity defense, would be 
most likely to prefer a NGRI verdict and to give a mental health facility recommendation.  
Hypothesis 4: 
Participants in the flow chart condition should have more correct knowledge and fewer 
false beliefs about a defendant found NGRI than participants in the Georgia dispositional group 
and the no information group.  
Hypothesis 5:  Participants in the flow chart condition should be least likely of all groups 
to believe that the defendant will continue to be a danger to society. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
 A convenience sample of 116 undergraduate students enrolled in Introduction to 
Psychology and other psychology courses at Georgia Southern University participated for course 
credit and/or extra credit. The participants were 32% male, 68% female, 29.3% African-
American, 63.8% Caucasian-American, 1.7% Hispanic-American, .9% Asian-American, 1.7% 
other American and 2.6% were citizens from another country. The mean age of participants was 
21 years old (SD = 3.5) and 26.7 % were freshman, 17.2% were sophomores, 25% were juniors 
and 31% were seniors. A majority (97.4%) had never served on a jury or received treatment for a 
mental illness (94.8%). However 62.1% of students indicated that someone in their family or a 
close friend had received treatment for mental illness.  
Design 
 The design of the study for analyses was a 2 (negative attitude towards insanity: low vs. 
high) X 3 (dispositional instruction: no instruction vs. Georgia dispositional instruction vs. 
Georgia dispositional instruction plus flowchart). 
Materials 
 The Insanity Defense Attitude Scale-Revised (IDA-R), developed by Skeem, Louden, & 
Evans (2004), is a self-report measure used to assess attitudes toward the insanity defense (see 
Appendix A). There are two sub-scales; one, labeled “strict liability,” which includes questions 
assessing the belief that mental illness is associated with a lowered ability to make rational 
decisions (e.g., “ I believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what 
their mental condition.”) and the other, labeled “injustice and danger,” which includes questions 
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assessing the belief that the insanity defense is misused (e.g.,  “The insanity defense threatens 
public safety by telling criminals that they can get away with a crime if they come up with a 
good story about why they did it.”) (Skeem et al., 2004). Both subscales have been shown to 
have internal consistency (α = .68 for strict liability, α = .88 for injustice and danger) (Skeem et 
al., 2004).  
The IDA-R also shows convergent validity with the similar Insanity Defense Support 
(IDS) scale, such that the strict liability scale on the IDA-R is strongly associated with the 
punishment scale from IDS (r = -.75) and the injustice and danger scale of the IDA-R is strongly 
associated with the IDS perceived danger scale (r = .67) (Skeem et al., 2004). Participants’ 
scores on the IDA-R are also a strong predictor of participants’ case judgments. This is 
especially true when looking at the strict liability subscale of the IDA-R, such that high scores on 
the IDA-R are related to more guilty verdicts, and low scores on the IDA-R are related to more 
NGRI verdicts, which can be seen across different samples (Skeem et al., 2004; Skeem et al., 
2001). Cronbach’s alphas for the current sample were .88 for the strict liability subscale and .87 
for the injustice and danger subscale.  Cronbach’s alpha for the total IDA-R was .88. 
Case description. Participants read a criminal case description in which a defendant is 
accused of committing murder.  The case described a man who was mentally ill, as defined by 
mental health experts in court, and who was not aware that he had done anything wrong. The 
experts go on to say that at the time of the stabbing, which resulted in the victim’s death, the 
defendant more than likely believed he was being threatened which may have caused him to 
react violently. At the end of the case description, participants read that the defendant pled Not 
Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI). 
   
24 
 
Dispositional instruction.  After reading the case description, one third of participants 
were randomly assigned to the Georgia dispositional instruction condition in which they read a 
short sentence containing information about what happens to a defendant if they are actually 
found NGRI (permitted by Georgia Law (Georgia Annotated Code,  17-7-131 as cited in 
Wheatman & Shaffer, 2001)): 
Should you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime, 
 the defendant will be committed to a state mental health facility until such  time, if ever, 
 that the court is satisfied that he should be released pursuant to law. 
(see Appendix B). Another third of participants were randomly assigned to read the Georgia  
instructions plus a detailed flowchart depicting what happens to a defendant if they are found not 
guilty by reason of insanity (see Appendix C). The final third of participants were randomly 
assigned to receive no dispositional instructions with their materials. Participants did not receive 
judge’s instructions about legal insanity because research by Skeem et al. (2004) found that 
verdict patterns were similar for mock jurors who received instructions and those who received 
no instructions.  
All participants also received a demographics questionnaire and a questionnaire asking 
participants to indicate their verdict: not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty.  
Participants then chose a punishment from the following options: probation, life, death, or time 
in a mental health facility or prison. Participants who recommended time in a mental health 
facility or prison, were prompted to write in a number of years they suggested for the chosen 
punishment.  
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Participants also completed a manipulation check, in which they responded to an open- 
ended question asking what happens to a defendant found NGRI. Dispersal and collection of all 
packets was monitored by a researcher.  
Procedure 
 Participants arrived in a classroom with no more than 40 other participants. After 
completion of informed consent, they were given packets. Participants were told that they should 
complete the materials in the order presented, and that they had a 50- minute time limit. The 
order of the questionnaires in the packet was as follows: IDA-R, case description, procedural 
information (when assigned), verdict and suggested punishment questionnaire, demographics 
questionnaire, and manipulation check. Participants were told not to go back to previously 
completed sections. 
 Upon completion of the packet, participants received a full debriefing which consisted of 
giving each participant a handout, and were asked not to discuss the study with other prospective 
participants. Finally, participants were thanked for their participation and dismissed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 It was hypothesized that preexisting biases about the insanity defense, would have more 
impact on the juror’s verdict determination than information presented during trial, that 
providing mock jurors with factual information about the result of a verdict of a defendant found 
not guilty by reason of insanity would increase the likelihood of a NGRI verdict, and if the 
information was presented about defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity in a more 
specific, flow chart manner this would increase not guilty by reason of insanity verdicts 
compared to the other conditions. 
Preliminary analyses 
Manipulation check: Comprehension of dispositional instruction. Participants were 
asked, “What happens to a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity?” to assess 
participants’ comprehension of dispositional information.  If our manipulation was successful, 
participants who received the Georgia Instructions and the Georgia Instructions plus the 
flowchart should demonstrate more correct knowledge than participants who did not receive any 
dispositional information. Their responses to this question were coded for correct knowledge and 
false beliefs.  Coders were blind to the hypotheses and the manipulation that the participants 
received. Cohen’s Kappa was used to assess inter-rater reliability between coders.  Kappa was 
acceptable, ranging from .81-.86.  
There are two elements of correct knowledge of NGRI disposition.  (1) knowledge that 
an NGRI defendant will be committed to a mental health facility; and (2) knowledge that the 
time of commitment is indeterminate; that is a judge must be satisfied that the person should be 
released.  Participants’ responses to the open-ended question were coded for this correct 
   
27 
 
knowledge. Participants received one point for each correct answer.  Participants received 0.5 
points on the second question if they indicated that someone had to determine that the acquitted-
insane person had restored their sanity, but they did not correctly mention that this was 
determined by a judge or court. Thus, their knowledge scores could range from zero to two 
points.   
Only two participants scored a perfect 2 points (M = .81, Mdn = 1.0, SD = .56). The false 
beliefs codes included (3) whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could be set 
free immediately, without treatment or punishment, (4) whether the participant stated that the 
defendant would or could commit more crimes, (5) whether the participant stated that the 
defendant would or could be let out too early or the consequences would not be harsh enough, 
(6) whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could ever go to prison, (7) 
whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could be put on probation or receive a 
sentence other than prison or mental health facility, and (8) whether the participant stated that 
he/she did not know what would happen or they were unsure of what would happen to the 
defendant (see Appendix H). Participants received one point for each false belief they 
mentioned.  Scores could range from zero to six points. Participants’ scores ranged from zero to 
two points (M = .5, Mdn = 0, SD = .69).  Table 1 shows the frequency of each false belief by 
condition. False beliefs did not reliably vary by condition (all p’s > .05).   
Attitudes towards the insanity defense. To assess whether participants’ IDA-R scores 
were randomly distributed across conditions, a one-way ANOVA was conducted.  Surprisingly, 
the analysis was significant, indicating that IDA-R scores were not randomly distributed, F(2, 
113) = 4.25, p = .02.  A post-hoc examination of the means showed that participants randomly 
assigned to the No Information condition scored significantly lower on the IDA-R (M = 3.63, SD 
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= .83) than did  participants assigned to the Georgia Dispositional Instruction Condition (M = 
4.24, SD = 1.08).  Participants assigned to the Flowchart Condition (M = 4.05, SD = .82) scored 
similarly to participants in the other two conditions.  Consequently, we analyzed the effects of 
the different dispositional instructions on the dependent variables with ANCOVAs, to control for 
IDA-R scores.  All assumptions underlying the ANCOVA were tested and met before 
proceeding.  
Participants’ responses to the two subscales of the IDA-R were summed and averaged. 
Scores could range from one to seven.  Average scores on the strict liability subscale ranged 
from 1.7 to 6.4 (M = 3.74; SD = 1.03 ).  Average scores on the injustice and danger subscale 
ranged from 1.33 to 7 (M = 4.14 ; SD = 1.08).  Because the subscales were strongly correlated, (r 
= .53) the IDA-R in its entirety was also summed and averaged, with averages ranging from 1.53 
to 6.68 (M = 3.98 ; SD = .94 ).   
Judgments of verdict and punishment. No participant chose a verdict of not guilty; verdict 
scores were dummy coded as either NGRI (0) or Guilty (1).  No participant chose probation as a 
sentencing recommendation, only 11 participants recommended life in prison, and only 2 
participants recommended the death sentence.  Thus, recommendations for some prison time, life 
in prison, and death were combined into a Prison variable.  Punishment scores were then dummy 
coded as either Mental Health Facility (0) or Prison (1).  Participants were asked to rate their 
estimate that the defendant committed the crime on a scale from one to seven with scores ranging 
from 4 to 7 (M = 6.35, SD = .82) and confidence that the verdict chosen was appropriate with 
scores ranging from 2 to 7 (M = 5.61, SD = 1.20). Because there was a restriction of range of 
estimation scores, this variable was not analyzed further. Verdict confidence was not related to 
IDA-R scores, verdict, or punishment, and thus was dropped from further analyses.   
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Bivariate correlations were then calculated between IDA-R scores, IDA-R subscale 
scores, the dependent measures of verdict, punishment, and the manipulation check variables of 
correct knowledge, false beliefs, and belief in future dangerousness. As Table 2 shows, both 
subscales were positively correlated with sentence recommendation and verdict, with the strict 
liability subscale being more strongly correlated with both verdict and sentence. However, the 
injustice and danger subscale is more strongly positively correlated with the belief that the 
defendant will continue to be a danger to society than the strict liability subscale. The belief that 
the defendant will continue to be a danger to society is also positively correlated with the number 
of false beliefs, and the number of false beliefs is negatively correlated with the correct 
knowledge score.  
Tests of hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 stated that pre-existing biases about the insanity defense would affect a 
mock juror’s verdict determination and sentence recommendation. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that those with an inaccurate opinion of the insanity defense would be more likely 
to say the defendant is guilty and recommend prison time while participants with positive or 
neutral opinions about the insanity defense would be more likely to say the defendant is not 
guilty by reason of insanity and recommend time in a mental health facility.  
 As shown in table 2 and described above, both subscales of the IDA-R were positively 
associated with verdict and punishment.  To assess the percentage of low and high IDA-R 
participants that voted for either a NGRI verdict or a guilty verdict, a median split was used to 
classify participants as either low or high on the IDA-R (Mdn = 4.16) such that all participants 
scoring between 1 and 4.15 were classified as low (N = 63) and participants scoring between 
4.16 and 7 were classified as high (N = 53).  
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 As expected, results showed that IDA-R scores were reliably related to verdict 
preference, 2(1, N = 116) = 28.38, p < .001. Of participants who were classified as low on the 
IDA-R, 79% said the defendant was NGRI while only 21% said guilty. Participants who were 
classified as high on the IDA-R had opposite results such that 30% said the defendant was NGRI 
and 70% said guilty.  
 Separate median splits were also conducted to classify participants as either low or high 
on the injustice and danger subscale (Mdn = 4.33) such that all participants scoring between 1 
and 4.33 were classified as low (N = 56) and participants scoring between 4.34 and 7 were 
classified as high (N = 60). A median split was also conducted for the strict liability subscale 
(Mdn = 3.9) such that all participants scoring between 1 and 3.9 were classified as low (N = 62) 
and participants scoring between 4 and 7 were classified as high (N = 54).  
 Beliefs of injustice and dangerousness were reliably related to verdicts, 2(1, N = 116) = 
5.30, p = .02. Of participants who were classified as low on the injustice and dangerousness 
subscale, 68% said the defendant was NGRI while only 32% said guilty. Participants who were 
classified as high on the injustice and dangerousness were about evenly split, such that 47% said 
the defendant was NGRI and 53% said guilty.   
 Beliefs in strict liability were also reliably related to verdicts,2(1, N = 116) = 26.6, p < 
.001. Of participants who were classified as low on the strict liability subscale, 79 % said the 
defendant was NGRI and 21% said the defendant was guilty. Participants who were classified as 
high on the strict liability subscale showed an opposite pattern, such that 31.5% preferred a 
NGRI verdict and 68.5% preferred a guilty verdict.  Overall, the pattern of results shows that a 
high belief in strict liability is strongly predictive of a guilty verdict. See Table 3 for an 
examination of all verdict recommendations. 
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 IDA-R scores were also reliably related to sentence recommendation, 2(1, N = 116) = 
6.13, p = .01. Of the participants who chose to sentence the defendant to a mental health facility, 
61% were low in IDA-R scores and 39% were high.  Of the participants who chose to sentence 
the defendant to a prison term, 34.5% were low in IDA-R scores and 65.5% were high.    
 We also examined the sentence recommendations of individuals low and high in each of 
the two subscales.  Beliefs in injustice and dangerousness were not reliably related to sentence 
recommendations, 2(1, N = 116) = .74, p = .26.  The large majority of participants low in 
injustice and dangerousness beliefs (79%) and the large majority of participants high in injustice 
and dangerousness beliefs (72%) recommended that the defendant be sentenced to a mental 
health hospital.  However, beliefs in strict liability were reliably related to sentence 
recommendations, 2(1, N = 116) = 10.39, p = .001. Participants low in strict liability beliefs 
(87%) were more likely to recommend a mental health facility for the defendant than were 
participants high in strict liability beliefs (61%).  See Table 4 for an examination of punishment 
recommendations.  
 To test hypotheses 2a, 2b, 4, and 5, the effects of the different dispositional instructions 
on verdict, sentence, dispositional knowledge, dispositional false beliefs, and the belief that the 
defendant would continue to be a danger to society if found NGRI, we conducted a one-way 
MANCOVA while controlling for IDA-R scores, F (10, 216) = 2.16, p = .01, ŋ² = .10.  Follow-
up univariate tests showed that the dispositional instructions did not reliably affect verdict (p = 
.60) or the number of false beliefs about what happens to a defendant found NGRI (p = .80).  
Dispositional instructions had a marginally significant effect on sentence recommendation, F(2, 
111) =  2.92, p = .058,  ŋ² = .05, with participants who received the flow chart being more likely 
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to recommend a prison sentence than participants who received the Georgia instructions or no 
instructions.   
 Follow-up univariate tests also showed a main effect of dispositional instructions on 
dispositional knowledge, F(2,111) = 3.38, p = .04, ŋ² =.06. Participants who received no 
dispositional information were less knowledgeable about what happens to a defendant found 
NGRI (M = .65, SD = .50) than were participants who read the Georgia dispositional instructions 
(M = .92, SD = .61) or participants who read the Georgia dispositional instructions with a 
flowchart (M = .86, SD = .54).  Follow-up univariate tests also showed a main effect of 
dispositional instructions on the belief that the defendant would continue to be a danger to 
society if found NGRI, F(2, 111), =  3.69, p = .04,  ŋ² = .06  Participants who received the flow-
chart (M = 4.95, SD = 1.37 ) were less likely to believe that the defendant would continue to be a 
danger to society if they were released than participants receiving no information (M = 5.24, SD 
= 1.38) and participants receiving the Georgia instructions ( M = 5.29, SD = 1.35).   
We could not adequately test hypothesis 3, since the insanity defense attitudes were not 
randomly distributed across dispositional instructions. However, an examination of participants 
with low vs. high IDA-R scores within each of the three levels of dispositional instructions 
showed an interesting pattern. Participants who were classified as low on the IDA-R were more 
likely to choose a sentence of NGRI, while participants classified as high on the IDA-R were 
more likely to choose a sentence of guilty in all three dispositional instruction groups. Further, a 
majority of participants recommended a mental health facility sentence, regardless of IDA-R 
scores. The one exception was that participants in the flow-chart condition who were classified 
as high on the IDA-R were more likely to recommend a prison sentence (see Tables 5 and 6).  
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The main goal in conducting this research was to examine the impact attitudes about the 
insanity defense have on verdict and sentencing and to assess a new way of delivering 
dispositional instructions so participants will use correct information instead of attitudes to help 
them when determining a verdict and recommending a sentence (Wheatman & Shaffer, 2001; 
Wiener et al., 2004). Similarly to Wheatman and Shaffer (2001), it was hypothesized that people 
who serve on juries may not accept insanity pleas because they do not fully understand what 
happens to the defendant should they be found NGRI, and therefore are worried that the 
defendant will simply be let free.  
The first hypothesis stated that pre-existing biases about the insanity defense would affect 
a mock juror’s verdict determination and sentence recommendation. This hypothesis was 
supported, such that participants scoring low on the IDA-R were more likely to suggest the 
defendant be detained to a mental health facility and participants scoring high on the IDA-R 
were more likely to suggest the defendant be detained to prison.  
It was also hypothesized that if the information about defendants found NGRI was 
presented in a more specific way, such as a flow chart, the number of NGRI verdicts and lenient 
punishment suggestions should be even further increased.  Contrary to hypotheses, dispositional 
instructions did not affect verdict choice. Surprisingly, participants who received the flowchart 
were more likely to recommend a prison sentence than were participants who received the 
Georgia instructions or no instructions. Verdict and punishment suggestions were driven by 
the Strict Liability subscale of the IDA-R, not the injustice and dangerousness subscale.  Thus it 
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appears participants want the defendant to be held responsible for the crime, even if insane 
during the commission.   
 It was hypothesized that participants in the flow chart condition would have more correct 
knowledge and less false beliefs about a defendant found NGRI than participants in the Georgia 
dispositional group and the no information group. Participants who received no dispositional 
information were less knowledgeable about what happens to a defendant found than were 
participants who read the Georgia dispositional instructions or participants who read the Georgia 
dispositional instructions with a flowchart. Also, a main effect was found for dispositional 
instructions on the belief that the defendant would continue to be a danger to society if found 
NGRI. Participants who received the flow-chart were less likely to believe that the defendant 
would continue to be a danger to society if they were released than participants receiving no 
information and participants receiving the Georgia instructions. Further, it was expected that if 
the participant received no dispositional information and had a negative opinion of the insanity 
defense, then the participant would be more likely to render a guilty verdict. While the 
dispositional information did not have any effect on verdict, participants in the no information 
condition who scored high on the IDA-R were more likely to suggest the defendant go to prison.  
These results add to the available literature because while it was expected that attitudes 
toward the insanity defense would affect verdict and sentence recommendation, it was also 
expected that if participants received the flow-chart their attitudes could be overcome and they 
would be able to use the information from the flow-chart rather than their false beliefs. This was 
not the case. In fact, the flow-chart seemed to have the opposite effect on participants. This may 
be due in part to participants simply glancing at the flow chart, and focusing on the overall image 
of the document and focusing on only one central aspect of it. If participants came in to the study 
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with a schema regarding NGRI verdict, they may have simply focused on the part of the flow 
chart that supported their schema and ignored everything else.  
Also, in the Georgia dispositional instructions the words “if ever” are used when 
describing the time frame in which the defendant could be released. In the flow chart, the 
possibility of release is mentioned twice with no specific time period attached. Participants may 
have believed that the defendant would get out too early if they received the flow chart because 
the phrase “if ever” implies a long time which may have seemed more appealing to participants.  
Future Research 
 This research displays the extent to which pre-existing attitudes about the insanity 
defense influences mock jurors when it comes to sentencing and determining punishment. It 
would be beneficial to further examine the relationship between attitudes and verdict and 
sentencing, to possibly discover a root cause and control for this phenomenon. Other researchers 
Wheatman & Shafer (2001;) Wiener et al., (2004;) Schlumper et al., (2009) have attempted to 
overcome the effect attitudes have on mock jurors; however pre-existing ideas seem to have a 
greater impact.  
  Any future interventions need to address the liability concerns presented in the strict 
liability subscale of the IDA-R.  Participants need to be educated that an NGRI verdict, and a 
sentence to a mental health facility, will still hold the defendant accountable for what 
happened.  Future research could also examine expanding on the flow chart used in the current 
study. While this study did not find significant results, altering the layout, wording or 
presentation of the flow chart to participants could yield more expected results. To enhance the 
retention of knowledge about the flow chart, future researchers could set up the presentation as a 
Powerpoint in which participants are shown one part of the flow chart on each slide. This would 
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allow the researcher to control the amount of time participants spend looking at each aspect of 
the flow chart, and it would help ensure that every part of the flow chart is read and understood, 
(not just one or two major points).  
Also, because the Georgia dispositional instructions and the flow chart did not have an 
effect on verdict, future research should provide mock jurors with information on the meaning of  
a NGRI verdict. It may have been difficult for participants to understand that NGRI does not 
mean the person is innocent, but that they were unaware that what they were doing at the time 
the crime was committed was wrong. It was found that some participants said the defendant was 
guilty while still recommending a sentence in a mental health facility. This suggests that the 
participant might lean towards a guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict, which is only allowed in 
14 states (Melville & Naimark, 2002).   
In these states, a defendant found GBMI serves their sentence in prison and is required to 
receive psychiatric treatment while serving their sentence, but they may also be restricted to a 
psychiatric ward, which is more restrictive than a regular prison block (Melville & Naimark, 
2002). Further, prisons do not have the best psychiatric help because all inmates can get 
treatment, GBMI or not, so the defendant might not receive adequate treatment. If participants 
were made aware of the differences, they might be less inclined to render a verdict of guilty, 
knowing what the consequences are.  
The relationship between attitudes, knowledge about the trial process and the type of 
defendant involved, and verdict determination needs to be studied further to ensure future jurors 
are as well educated as possible and eliminate everything all other factors aside from what 
information is presented during trial to provide defendants with a truly fair trial.  
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APPENDIX A 
Instructions: For each question below, circle the number that best represents your attitude.  
 
1. The insanity defense returns disturbed, dangerous people to the streets.  
                  1-------------2-----------3-----------4-----------5---------6-----------7 
 Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly                                                                          
Disagree                Disagree          Disagree            Agree                                   Agree 
             nor  Agree 
 
2. I believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what their 
mental condition.  
                   1-------------2-------------3----------4----------5-------------6-------------7 
        Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
        Disagree                                    Disagree            Disagree            Agree                                       Agree 
           nor  Agree 
3.  Perfectly sane killers can get away with their crimes by hiring high-priced lawyers and 
experts who misuse the insanity defense.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
            Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
                                                                                                   nor  Agree 
4. Most defendants who use the insanity defense are truly mentally ill, not fakers. 
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
 
5. The insanity defense threatens public safety by telling criminals that they can get away 
with a crime if they come up with a good story about why they did it.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
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6. I believe that we should punish a person for a criminal act only if he understood the act 
as evil and then freely chose to do it.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
7. The insanity plea is a loophole in the law that allows too many guilty people to escape 
punishment.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree             Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
8. Some people with severe mental illness are out of touch with reality and do not 
understand that their acts are wrong. These people cannot be blamed and do not deserve 
to be punished.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree          Disagree               Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
 
9. Mentally ill defendants who plead insanity have failed to exert enough willpower to 
behave properly like the rest of us. So, they should be punished for their crimes like 
everyone else.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
 
10. With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can use the insanity defense to 
finagle his way to freedom.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
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11. A defendant's degree of insanity is irrelevant: if he commits the crime, then he should 
do the time. 
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
 
12. We should punish people who commit criminal acts, regardless of their degree of 
mental disturbance.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
 
 
13. For the right price, psychiatrists will probably manufacture a “mental illness” for any 
criminal to convince the jury that he is insane.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
   nor  Agree 
 
14. I believe that mental illness can impair people's ability to make logical choices and 
control themselves. 
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree            Disagree             Agree                                       Agree 
      nor  Agree 
15. I believe that all human beings know what they are doing and have the power to 
control themselves.  
              1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree               Agree                                       Agree 
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 nor  Agree 
 
16. It is wrong to punish people who commit crime for crazy reasons while gripped by 
uncontrollable hallucinations or delusions.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree               Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
 
17. Many of the crazy criminals that psychiatrists see fit to return to the streets go on to 
kill again.  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree              Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
  
18. It is wrong to punish someone for an act they commit because of an uncontrollable 
illness, whether it be epilepsy or mental illness.   
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
         Disagree                                    Disagree           Disagree               Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
 
  19. As a last resort, defense attorneys will encourage their clients to act strangely and lie                  
through their teeth to appear “insane.”  
             1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
           Strongly            Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree              Strongly       
       Disagree                                    Disagree            Disagree            Agree                                       Agree 
 nor  Agree 
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APPENDIX B 
    Case Description 
 The defendant, Jim Green, has been charged with second-degree murder and has 
entered a plea of NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY.  
Robert Wilson, age 30, often walked to Stevenson’s Grocery Store, which was across 
the street from his apartment building. One evening, he had a few of his friends over 
to watch a football game on TV. He offered to go to the store to get some snacks and 
beverages, but had not returned after several hours. One of his friends, Andrew, 
decided to go to the store himself to check if Robert was still there. Not finding him, 
he returned to Robert’s apartment and called the police, who found Robert’s body 
behind the store. The medical examiner confirmed that the victim had died as a 
result of being stabbed twice in the back. A knife found at the scene was confirmed to 
be the murder weapon. On the knife, the police found fingerprints, which matched 
those of Jim Green, who was picked up a block away from the store. 
Jim Green was identified by the store clerk as having loitered around the store’s 
parking lot for the past few days. The police had initially only wanted to question 
him, but decided to fingerprint him after the store clerk stated that Jim had left the 
area shortly after the victim did. Upon further inspection, the police noticed that he 
had blood on his hands. Additionally, two eyewitnesses stated that they saw Green 
wandering in the store’s parking lot and then leave abruptly just after the victim left 
the store. 
Two experienced mental health professionals (a psychologist and a psychiatrist) 
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were appointed by the court to examine the defendant. These professionals’ reports 
and testimony were in agreement and indicated that the defendant was seriously 
mentally ill and not likely to improve with treatment. They testified that the 
defendant showed that he didn’t know right from wrong and was not capable of 
understanding the harmful consequences of his actions. They also stated that the 
defendant did not know what he was doing at the time he committed the crime, and 
still wasn’t sure that he had committed it at all and believed that the victim was 
probably threatening him in some way and that the killing was in self defense, or that 
the police were just making up the crime to put him away. The convenience store 
clerk testified that he had actually hired the defendant to clean the store’s parking lot, 
which was part of the clerk’s duties, but had changed his mind when the defendant 
had started harassing customers. The defendant’s uncle testified that Green had 
been staying with him for the past two weeks since moving to town. The defendant’s 
uncle also stated that Green had confided in him that he thought people were out to 
get him and that he often felt the need to protect himself. The uncle testified that he 
attributed the defendant’s frequent episodes of bizarre behavior to drug use, but drug 
testing and medical records showed that the defendant was not on drugs. The uncle 
was not aware that for the past several years, Green had been in and out of mental 
hospitals where he was treated for various mental illnesses. His medical records 
indicated several hospital admissions where Green was given medication, which 
improved his condition only briefly. Once he was released, his problems seemed too 
much for him to control, even while he was medicated. At times during the trial, the 
defendant showed strange mood swings and appeared to argue with his lawyers. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Please read and consider the following information when determining a verdict.  
 
Should you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the 
crime, the defendant will be committed to a state mental health facility until such time, if 
ever, that the court is satisfied that he should be released pursuant to law. 
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APPENDIX D 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
Please answer the following questions as if you were one of the actual jurors in this case. Put an X by 
your verdict.  For the remaining questions circle the number that best corresponds to your answer.  
1. What is your verdict in this case? 
  
Guilty___ 
 Not guilty___ 
Not guilty by reason of insanity___ 
 
2. What is your estimate that the defendant committed the crime? 
 
         1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7 
        Not at all               Extremely 
                Likely                   Likely 
 
3. How confident are you that your verdict is appropriate? 
 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7 
         Not at all               Extremely 
         Confident              Confident 
 
4. Please circle the sentence that best describes your opinion of the consequences Mr. Green 
should receive, if any:  
 
Probation                        Life      Death  
 
 
_____ years in mental health facility                _____ years in prison                                                  
Please write exact number of years   Please write exact number of   years 
and not a range of years.    years and not a range of years.         
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Please answer the following question as completely as possible.  
 
 
1) What happens to defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circle the number that best represents your attitude.  
 
2) Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity continue to be a danger to society.  
                         1----------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
  Strongly                Disagree         Somewhat           Neither         Somewhat           Agree               Strongly                                                         
 Disagree                                         Disagree             Disagree           Agree                                          Agree 
                        nor  Agree 
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APPENDIX F 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Instructions:  Please place an X next to the appropriate label that best describes you, and 
write your numerical age.    
1.) Your sex:                             ____Male                              ____Female 
2.) Your ethnicity:                    ____African American         ____Native American 
                          ____Caucasian American     ____ Asian American 
                          ____Hispanic American       ____Other American 
                          ____ Citizen from another country 
3.) Your age:                            _____  
4.) Year in college:                 ____Freshman                     ____Sophomore 
                                            ____Junior                           ____Senior 
                                            ____Other 
 
5.) Have you ever served as a juror in a criminal case?       _____ yes     _____ no 
  
6.) Have you ever received treatment for a mental illness?  _____ yes     _____ no 
 
7.) Have any of your close friends or family members received treatment for a mental 
illness?                                                                             _____ yes     _____ no  
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APPENDIX H 
Coding Instructions  
What happens to defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity? 
 
Read a participant’s entire answer to the manipulation check.  
Code 1: Code each answer on whether the participant showed knowledge that an NGRI 
defendant will be committed to a mental health facility.  
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Code 2: Code each answer on whether the participant showed knowledge that the time of 
commitment is indeterminate; that is the court must be satisfied that the person should be 
released.  
0 = no  
0.5 = authority, professional, someone other than the court determines release 
1 = yes 
Code 3: Code each answer on whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could be 
set free immediately, without treatment or punishment.  
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Code 4: Code each answer on whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could 
commit more crimes.  
0 = no 
1 = yes 
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Code 5: Code each answer on whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could be 
let out too early or the consequences would not be harsh enough.  
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Code 6: Code each answer on whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could 
ever go to prison. 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Code 7: Code each answer on whether the participant stated that the defendant would or could be 
put on probation or receive a sentence other than prison or mental health facility.  
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Code 8: Code each answer on whether the participant stated that he/she didn’t know what would 
happen or they were unsure of what would happen to the defendant.  
 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
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Table 1 
Frequency of false beliefs by condition 
 
 Flow-Chart Georgia Instructions No Instructions 
Defendant would or 
could be set free 
immediately 
 
7.5% 
 
20.5% 
 
16.2% 
Defendant would or 
could commit more 
crimes 
 
5% 
 
7.9% 
 
8.1% 
Defendant could or 
would be let out too 
early or punishment 
would not be harsh 
enough 
 
 
5% 
 
 
5.1% 
 
 
0% 
Defendant would or 
could go to prison 
12.5% 7.7% 5.4% 
Defendant would or 
could be put on 
probation 
 
10% 
 
2.6% 
 
5.4% 
Participant did not 
know what would 
happen to defendant 
 
7.5% 
 
5.1% 
 
13.5% 
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Table 2 
                                                  Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. IDA total score 1.00 .786** .817** .521** .303** .584** .220** -.086 
2. IDA injustice and danger 
subscale 
 1.00 .528** .360** .185* .544** .205* -.137 
3. IDA strict liability subscale   1.00 .546** .405** .442** .258** -.130 
4. Verdict    1.00 .462** .314** .231* -
.220* 
5. Sentence     1.00 .173 .087 .018 
6. Belief defendant continues to be 
a danger 
     1.00 .219* -.122 
 
7. Number of false beliefs 
      1.00 -.544** 
8. Correct knowledge score        1.00 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).  
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Table 3 
Verdict Suggestion 
IDA-R Classification                Guilty   NGRI 
Low IDA-R 21% 79% 
High IDA-R  70% 30% 
 
Verdict Suggestion 
IDA Subscale Classifications NGRI Guilty 
Low Injustice and Danger 68% 32% 
High Injustice and Danger 47% 53% 
Low Strict Liability 79% 21% 
High Strict Liability 31.5% 68.5% 
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Table 4 
Sentence Recommandation 
IDA-R Classification    Prison Mental Health Facility 
Low IDA-R 35% 61% 
High IDA-R  66% 39% 
 
Sentence Recommendation 
IDA Subscale Classifications Mental Health Facility Prison 
Low Injustice and Danger 79% 21% 
High Injustice and Danger 72% 28% 
Low Strict Liability 87% 13% 
High Strict Liability 61% 39% 
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Table 5 
Relationships between low and high IDA-R and verdict within each condition 
Flowchart 
IDA-R Classifications NGRI Guilty 
Low 81% 19% 
High 26.3% 73.7% 
 
Georgia Instructions 
IDA-R Classifications NGRI Guilty 
Low 72.2% 27.8% 
High 38.9% 61.9% 
 
No Instructions 
IDA-R Classifications NGRI Guilty 
Low 83.3% 16.7% 
High 23.1% 76.9% 
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Table 6 
 Relationships between low and high IDA-R and sentence recommendation within each 
condition 
 
Flowchart 
IDA-R Classifications Mental Health Facility Prison 
Low 81% 19% 
High 42.1% 57.9% 
 
Georgia Instructions 
IDA-R Classifications Mental Health Facility Prison 
Low 77.8% 22.2% 
High 71.4% 28.6% 
 
No Instructions 
IDA-R Classifications Mental Health Facility Prison 
Low 91.7% 8.3% 
High 84.6% 15.4% 
 
